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•	 The rhetoric of social engineering is repeatedly used in 
the Russian narration on the Cossack nation. This social 
engineering has been served by historically-rooted slo-
gans such as ‘the Cossack state’ and ‘registered Cossacks’. 
Terms such as ‘the Cossack state service’ and ‘the Cossack 
component’ are also functionally marked concepts. These 
appear in different contexts (the patriotic education of 
children and young people, the so-called civil society of 
Russia and its allegedly traditional conservative values, 
the creation of pro-defence attitudes, military reserves, 
a social factor combating the new threats posed by cul-
ture, information, illegal migration, etc.). Such concepts 
are the product of the Kremlin’s political technology – by 
shaping the military organisation of society and its con-
frontational attitude, it is not so much describing a real-
ity as creating one.
•	 The legal status of the modern Russian Cossack nation, which 
is also referred to as ‘neo-Cossackdom’, situates it within the 
framework of the ‘third sector’, i.e. non-commercial organi-
sations for the public benefit. This serves to emphasise its 
ability to organise itself. In fact, the Cossack military associ-
ations of today have little to do either with grassroots social 
initiatives or the non-governmental sectors, not to mention 
folklore or historical re-enactment associations. Their ba-
sic distinguishing features are their control by the Kremlin 
and the exchange of mutual benefits (they serve the Kremlin 
in exchange for concessions and contracts). This is the result 
of the Kremlin’s long-term policy, which has led to the con-
version of a spontaneous social movement into a movement 
controlled from the top down. 
•	 The favourable political situation at present (including the 















field of small businesses) is swelling the ranks of Cossack 
organisations with officers from the security and defence 
sectors who are leaving to the reserves (these are the roots 
of the predominant part of the neo-Cossack elite); radicals 
who are hungry for publicity and influence; and random 
individuals who are looking for ways to resolve their fi-
nancial problems. This has led to a change in motivation 
for the neo-Cossacks, especially the younger generation. 
For them, neo-Cossackdom has opened up a career path, 
because other options are blocked to them; it offers easier 
access to education and a stable income. 
•	 The Cossacks’ imprecise legal, political and social status 
allows the Kremlin  to assign them to different roles: from 
paramilitary organisations that are intended to educate 
young people in the spirit of patriotism and obedience, 
via volunteer fire departments and forest guards, police 
reserves preventing crime, combating terrorism, extrem-
ism and illegal migration, up to the role of irregular forces 
in information warfare and the fight against illegal bor-
der crossings, civil defence and territorial defence forces. 
Their permanent incorporation into the security and de-
fence system is guaranteed by their non-hierarchical or-
ganisational structure, the subordination of the Cossack 
troops to the President, as well as their ever-closer ap-
proximation to military standards. This is the main mes-
sage of the Strategy of policy towards the Russian Cossacks 
to 2020. 
•	 The implementation of this strategy is distinguished by 
the strongly bureaucratic system for managing the neo-
Cossacks’ development, as well as the Putin system’s ina-
bility to generate new projects. Those currently being im-
plemented under the banner of self-financing are merely 
replicating the old ones, preserving the pathologies of 















placing the burden of implementing its policy on the re-
gional authorities: the ‘self-financing’ of the Cossack or-
ganisations mainly consists of them concluding more or 
less profitable contracts, financed by the regions. 
•	 The new wave of Cossack-mania in Russia has coincided 
with a U-turn by the Kremlin away from its previously 
declared modernisation of Russia and in the direction of 
traditionalism, a transition which clearly accelerated af-
ter the events on the Maidan in Kiev. The Kremlin’s ally in 
its Cossack policy is the Orthodox Church, and their plat-
form for cooperation is the concept of ‘Orthodox Russian 
civilisation’, which among other things shapes an attitude 
of civil obedience. Both the state and the Church have ex-
ploited the image of Cossackdom as a ‘free state’, and they 
present the Cossacks as a model of civil society (which is 
also an argument for the existence in Russia of a subject 
society), as well as the bearers of conservative Orthodox 
values fighting the rot of the West, Islamic fundamental-

















The roots of contemporary Cossack-mania in Russia
The	Russian	Cossacks	of	 today,	also	known	as	 the	neo-Cossacks	
(неоказачество),	 is	 in	 equal	 measure	 a	 product	 of	 a	 top-down	
Kremlin	policy	and	a	bottom-up	nationalist	movement.	Cossack	




versus	 peasants;	 Cossacks	 versus	 non-Russians,	 the	 so-called	









The	 disintegration	 of	 the	 empire,	 followed	 by	 the	 ‘de-Cossack-
isation’	 of	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 and	 the	 deportations	 under	 Stalin,	
completely	prevented	the	Cossacks	making	any	radical	demands	
for	many	decades,	but	did	not	uproot	these	desires	entirely.	The	
need	 to	 strengthen	 the	 Cossacks’	 newly	 conscious	 distinctive-
ness	and	‘ethnicity’	re-emerged	at	the	end	of	the	existence	of	the	




































to	 change	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 Cossacks	
became	more	 favourable	 thanks	 to	 the	 centralisation	 of	 power,	
together	with	 a	 change	of	 emphasis	 in	 the	direction	 of	Russian	


















































































the	 Cossack	 register,	 registered	 Cossackdom,	 the	 Cossack	 state	
service)	currently	bear	heavy	loads	of	misinformation,	as	a	result	






















I. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF COSSACKDOM 
IN RUSSIA: BASIC CONCEPTS
1. The ‘Cossack state’ in modern Russia
The historical term ‘Cossack state’, which bears a certain 
propaganda load with it, fits well into the official narrative 
as it conceals the existence of neo-Cossackdom. At the same 
time, though, it causes a kind of cognitive dissonance: the 
anachronistic Cossack community is portrayed as a symbol 
of freedom on the one hand, and on the other as a pillar of 
Russian ‘civil society’ which is distinguished by its service to 
the state and its identification with a militarised way of life. 
The concept of the ‘Cossack state’ remains obscure, something 
to which the various legal solutions have contributed. The 
Cossack state service today includes both the so-called ‘na-
tive-born’ Cossacks and the ‘crossdressers’ (as people ‘work-
ing as Cossacks’ are defined), who have little in common with 
traditional Cossackdom and its idealised and exalted values. 
The process of Cossackdom’s rebirth in the reality of the Putin 
regime has led to its transformation into ‘neo-Cossackdom’, 
that is, an auxiliary part of the ruling power corporation, to 
which it is linked by its common corporate interests (service, 
business, politics). Even today, the division of the Cossacks 






stratification	 in	 terms	 of	 property	 ownership,	 unemployment,	
and	the	outflow	of	youth	from	their	traditional	places	of	residence.	
The	public	image	of	the	Cossacks,	especially	among	the	older	gen-


















The	 grass-roots	movement,	which	was	 very	 lively	 in	 the	 1990s,	
improved	 its	 image	 by	 presenting	 itself	 as	 a	 ‘repressed	 ethnos’	








then	 semi-officially	 introduced	 into	 circulation,	 was	 willingly	
taken	up	by	the	Cossacks	themselves,	who	treated	it	as	synony-
mous	with	the	historical	 ‘free	Cossack	state’,	and	as	a	substitute	


































ries,	and	also	guarded	 its	borders	 in	 the	Caucasus,	Central	Asia	
and	the	Far	East.




terms,	 for	example,	 involves	 the	discussion	about	the	rebirth	of	
Russian	 Cossackdom	 in	 its	 historical	 homelands.	These	 ‘home-

















gional	 authorities	 have	 adapted	 their	 laws	 to	 federal	 legislation	 (https://
mustoi.ru/kazachestvu-zaxotelos-v-karelii-gosudarstvennuyu-podder-
zhku/;	http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/News/2017/05/0503_16.html).	The	
explanatory	memorandum	to	 the	regional	 law	on	the	Cossacks	 in	 the	Re-
public	of	Karelia	states:	“The	Cossack’s	experience	will	help	to	solve	many	
problems	 related	 to	 the	 security	 of	 the	 region,	 the	 protection	 of	 borders,	
improving	the	criminal-pathological	situation,	and	will	improve	the	socio-
economic	stability	of	the	region.”







































nal	 home	 territory	 of	 the	 ‘canonical’	 Kuban	 Troops,	 compared	































question,	 as	 their	 natural	 habitats	were	 the	 stanitsa	 (campsite)	
and	the	hutor	(farmstead).





































































office.	 For	 native-born	 Cossacks,	 these	 ‘non-natives’	 are	 treated	
ironically	as	‘crypto-Cossacks’,	‘the	self-proclaimed’,	‘crossdress-




tapose	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘Cossack’	with	 the	 term	 ‘Cossackdom’,	 i.e.	
the	‘real	Cossack	ethnos’,	in	contrast	with	the	‘crossdressers’	who	





















2. The legal status of Cossackdom: the ‘Cossack state 
service’
Neo-Cossackdom has little in common with the ethos of a ‘free 
people’: its supposedly ‘bottom-up’ initiatives are controlled 
from the Kremlin and subject to strict control. Moreover, 
crucial to the Kremlin are the Cossacks’ military/discipli-
nary features, which are covered by the term ‘Cossack state 
service’. This concept, which is of essential importance today 
in the official narrative, has supplanted previous considera-
tions on the revival and rehabilitation of the ‘Cossack nation’ 
in the public debate. In the face of the authorities’ increasing 
demands of this service, the Cossack organisations have not 
been and still are not able to recruit the necessary number of 
Cossacks to it. This has led to the Cossack associations rein-
forcing their ranks with representatives of the armed forces 
and other government departments of force who have been 
dismissed to the reserves, as well as random individuals (in-
cluding so-called freaks and radicals, often with criminal re-
cords), in a way which the current political situation favours. 
The legal regulations concerning the Cossack service have in-
troduced a division of the Cossacks into ‘registered’ and ‘un-
registered’ groups. 
The	 relevant	 legal	 definition	 is	 found	 in	Article	 5	 of	 the	 above-






















1)	 participation	 of	 Cossack	 associations	 in	 keeping	military	 re-
cords,	in	organising	the	military-patriotic	education	of	conscripts	
and	training	the	reservists;
2)	 participation	 in	 preventing	 crime	 and	 removing	 the	 conse-
quences	of	emergencies	and	natural	disasters,	 civil	and	 territo-
rial	defence;













cal	 authorities	 and	members	 of	 the	 registered	 associations.	The	






















interpretation	 also	 arise	 from	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 these	 associa-











they	were	 entered	 into	 the	 state	 register	 is	 determined	 by	 the	
regulations	of	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	which	maintains	this	reg-
ister.	Any	application	to	join	should	include	the	following	items:	
1)	 the	statutory	objectives	of	 the	organisation	 (the	maintenance	
of	the	traditional	lifestyle,	farming	and	customs	of	Cossackdom);	
2)	data	concerning	the	size	of	the	organisation’s	membership	(de-







































and	others,	where	 they	“entered	at	 the	request	of	 their	Cossack	
brothers,	who	represent	80%	of	the	population,	and	where	there	
was	a	 threat	of	 a	 repetition	of	 the	events	of	 the	Maidan”12.	This	
body	came	into	conflict	with	the	authorities	of	the	Lugansk	and	
Donetsk	 ‘People’s	 Republics’,	 and	 discredited	 themselves	 among	
the	local	population	as	a	result	of	their	drunken	brawling,	and	at	
the	end	of	the	same	year	they	withdrew.	However,	Kozitsyn	still	
keeps	 the	Ukrainian	 community	 under	 psychological	 pressure,	





of	28	state	orders,	 including	 the	Order	of	 the	Red	Standard	and	
the	Red	Star	 ‘For	Personal	Courage’	of	Peter	the	Great	and	Alex-
ander	Nevsky,	 and	also	has	 awards	 from	 the	Russian	Orthodox	
Church.	He	also	holds	the	rank	of	general	of	the	Cossack	troops,	
awarded	by	the	President	of	the	Russian	Federation.	He	has	had	






















He	participated	 in	 the	Transnistrian	 conflict	 (1992),	 and	 fought	







Association	 has	 been	 headed	 by	 the	 ataman	 Ivan	Mironov.	 His	
predecessor,	ataman	Valery	Nalimov,	currently	runs	the	Central	















































3. The ‘Cossack troops’
Assigning the Cossacks to all the roles they perform – from 
paramilitary organisations that deals with the patriotic 
(and Orthodox) education of young people, through the fire 
brigades, forest guards, crime prevention, the fights against 
terrorism and extremism, the protection of public facilities, 
the defence of state borders, as well as participation in the 
civil defence and territorial defence organisations – falls 
within the competence of the Cossack associations’ military 
staffs, which are currently being created or reconstructed. 
In the public space, these associations are called the ‘Cossack 
troops’. These so-called troops, which, by virtue of the dis-
cipline prevailing within them, could only conventionally 
be classified as irregular troops, are treated in the official 




























defence architecture. In fact, they are a form of territorial 
organisation for the Cossack associations. This is based on 
a principle of centralisation, that is, of the hierarchical sub-
ordination of the lower-level structures to the structures at 
the higher level. 
In Russia	 there	 are	 currently	 eleven	military	 Cossack	 societies	
(военные казачьи общества,	hereafter	VKO)	 in	operation;	 these	











been	 established.	These	 paramilitary	 associations,	 which	 draw	
upon	historical	 traditions	 and	 are	 commonly	 referred	 to	 as	 the	
Cossack	troops,	have	become	the	primary	platform	for	the	rela-






























The	 official	 data	 has	 been	 deliberately	 inflated.	These	numbers,	
as	 is	 apparent	 from	 statements	 by	 Nikolai	 Doluda,	 ataman	 of	




tal,	 along	with	 their	 families18.	The	Kuban	VKO	 consists	 of	 555	



























































Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function
Cossack General Ivan 
Mironov (Central Cos-
sack Troops)
Reserve FSB general; deputy governor 
of Samara oblast
Cossack Colonel Viktor 
Goncharov (Don Troops)



















Ataman (degree) Previous professional career and current administrative function
Cossack General Nikolai 
Doluda (Kuban Troops)
Professional soldier, deputy governor 
of Krasnodar krai
Cossack Colonel Gen-
nady Privalov (Siberian 
Army)
Professional soldier; head of the military 
administration of the Omsk oblast
Military starshyna Alek-
sandr Żurawski (Terek 
Troops)
Professional soldier; head of the committee 
for nationalities of the Stavropol krai
Cossack Colonel Yuri 
Ivanov (Volga Troops)
Former head of department in the Ministry 
of Civil Defence and Emergency Situations 
in the Samara oblast; head of the Ministry’s 
Supreme Board in the oblast
Cossack General Pavel 
Artamonov (Yenisei 
Troops)





Former prosecutor in Chita; deputy gover-
nor of the Trans-Baikal krai
Cossack General Nikolai 
Shakhov (Irkutsk 
Troops)
Professional soldier: advisor to the governor 




Former commander of the Interior Troops 





Police colonel, former head of prison service 
delegation in Khabarovsk krai, head of de-
partment for cooperation with Cossacks in 
the administration of Khabarovsk krai

























sandr	 Tkachov	 (now	 minister	 of	 agriculture),	 and	 the	 Central	
Troops	 to	 their	 proximity	 to	 the	Kremlin,	which	 counts	 on	 the	
Cossacks’	support	in	crisis	situations.	The	troops	are	covered	by	














teem.	Spectacular	changes	of	 the	guard	are	 the	specialty	of	 the	
Kuban	 Troops’	 VKO.	 It	was	 also	 the	 only	 such	 group	 honoured	





















gions.	The	Kuban	Cossacks’	 participation	 in	 the	 parade	was	 for	
propaganda	reasons23,	to	emphasise	the	historical	and	contempo-
rary	merits	of	the	Cossacks	(during	the	events	in	Crimea	in	2014).
By	 presidential	 decrees	 (no.s	 168,	 169,	 170	 and	 171),	 since	 2010	
the	VKOs	have	had	unified	uniforms	and	ranks;	they	have	been	
obliged	 to	 introduce	 special	 Cossack	 IDs	 (a	 type	 of	 small	 mili-
tary	booklet	in	passport	format,	issued	by	the	territorial	military	
police	for	five	years,	with	a	possible	extension	for	a	further	five	














































‘Military’	 discipline	 is	 also	 breached	 by	 atamans	 of	 individual	
troops.	 In	September	2013,	Metropolitan	Cyril	 of	Stavropol,	 the	
chairman	of	the	Synod	Committee	for	Cooperation	with	Cossack-
dom,	imposed	a	clerical	punishment	(epithymia)	on	the	atamans	
of	 the	Terek	 (Sergei	Klimenko24),	 Central	 (Valery	Nalimov)	 and	
Trans-Baikal	VKOs	(Sergei	Bobrov),	on	charges	of	separatist	ac-
tivities	 among	 the	 troops	 entrusted	 to	 them,	which	 resulted	 in	
their	dismissal	from	their	duties.	In	the	official	press,	the	subject	
was	 taboo;	 from	the	Cossack	 forums25,	 in	which	 the	case	raised	
a	wave	of	criticism	of	the	Church,	it	is	known	that	the	metropoli-
tan’s	decision	was	agreed	upon	with	Aleksander	Beglov,	the	head	
















































4. The ‘Cossack component’ as a subject in education and 
state policy
The essence of the state’s new policy towards Cossackdom is 
found in the term ‘the Cossack component’. This emphasises 






























potential of the Cossacks, who in the official narrative has be-
come a model for Russian society, its economic enterprise and 
its pro-defence activity. The Cossacks, as a kind of ‘healthy’ 
grassroots organisation of society, innately opposed to oppo-
sitionist organisations, constitute the most important argu-
ment for the existence of a civil, subjective society in Russia. 
Like the concept analysed above, the term does not so much 
describe reality as creates it. 
The new wave of Cossack-mania in the national narrative has 
coincided with the return of the previously announced ‘mod-
ernisation of Russia towards traditionalism’, which clearly ac-
celerated after the events on the Maidan in Kiev. ‘Faith’ in the 
national narrative has been strengthened by the Orthodox 
Church, which stresses that the Cossacks have always stood in 
the defence not only of Russia’s borders, but of the Orthodox faith.
The	term	‘the	Cossack	component’	appeared	in	the	context	of	the	































According	 to	 education	 minister	 Olga	 Vasileva29,	 the	 Cossack	





Cossack	 traditions,	 as	well	 as	 comprehensive	military-patriotic	
programs,	including	drills.	The	subject	also	includes	civic	educa-
tion,	shaping	the	philosophical	and	ethical	attitudes	in	the	spirit	






otic	 education	 of	 children	 and	 adolescents,	 based	 (among	 other	









Since	 2016	 the	 ‘Cossack	 component’	 school	 subject	 has	 also	 in-
cluded	 training	 in	cyber-warfare.	This	 is	 confirmed	by	 increas-
ingly	numerous	reports	of	Cossack	cyber-volunteers.	Their	tasks	









































of	 the	 process	 from	 the	 early	 2000s	when	 there	was	 a	massive	
influx	of	siloviki	 into	the	economy,	and	when	senior	representa-




















































Another	potential	 source	of	 cash	flows	 for	 the	Cossacks	 is	 their	
paid	security	 service.	This	business	 is	a	 tried	and	 tested	way	of	
funding	 security	 departments	 outside	 the	 state	 budget.	 In	 the	
case	of	the	neo-Cossacks	it	is	seen	as	almost	a	necessity:	the	mili-
tary	Cossack	associations	have	been	obliged	 to	appoint	and	reg-


























in	 the	 Russian	 Interior	 Ministry	 (which	 mainly	 affected	 posts	










ing	 essential	 state	 facilities	 of	 federal	 importance	 without	 the	
need	 to	 undergo	 a	 tendering	 procedure34.	 However,	 the	 project	
has	still	not	been	submitted	for	consideration	in	the	Duma.	
The	 supervision	 of	 such	 protection	 of	 important	 locations,	 spe-
cial	transports,	routes	and	installations,	as	well	as	the	protection	
of	 the	property	of	natural	and	 legal	persons,	 is	 the	 responsibil-
ity	of	the	above-mentioned	Federal	Service	of	the	National	Guard	
Troops,	 founded	 in	 2016.	 It	 also	 exercises	 supervision	 (‘federal	
























interest	 in	 increasing	 the	 Cossack	 contingent	 in	 its	 service	 by	
means	of	conscription,	as	well	as	in	broadening	the	scope	of	the	















the	Cossack	 security	 companies	 and	 the	private	military	 compa-
nies,	which	are	only	in	the	initial	stage	of	legislation37)	can	be	in-
terpreted	 in	 different	ways,	 including	 as	 a	 transition	 to	 Cossack	
self-financing.	We	should	also	note	that	this	applies	to	the	formally	
registered	Cossacks,	who	have	been	reinforced	by	soldiers	sent	to	









37	 С.	Шишкин:	 Казаки	 за	 создание	 ЧВК,	 ht	tp://	казачествомосквы.	рф/



























a	 14-episode	 television	series	based	on	Mikhail	Sholokhov’s	And 
quiet flows the Don,	which	was	retold	in	2015	in	the	form	of	a	soap	
opera.	Cossack	folklore	plays	a	role	which	is	difficult	to	overesti-
mate,	as	 it	has	 in	 fact	been	promoted	by	professional	state	song	


































of	 the	unskilled	Cossacks	 in	defence	 tasks40	 and	 turning	 it	 into	
‘a	kind	of	 army’,	 is	now	 (at	 least	declaratively)	 changing	 its	 ap-
proach,	 placing	 the	 emphasis	 on	 giving	 the	 Cossacks	 military	
training	as	an	organisational	base	for	territorial	defence.	Accord-





eral	Staff	will	gradually	create	 ‘Cossack	 troops’	with	 the	aim	of	
creating	at	least	one	Cossack	brigade	in	each	military	district41.	








This	 idea	 was	 eagerly	 received	 by	 some	 atamans,	 who	 argued	
that	 the	 existing	 legislation	 already	 assigned	 the	 Cossacks	 ter-
ritorial	defence	capabilities	(defending	a	state	of	emergency	and	
martial	law,	protecting	public	order,	protecting	important	state,	
industrial	 and	 military	 facilities,	 fighting	 terrorist	 and	 bandit	
groups,	 the	 additional	 protection	 of	 Russia’s	 borders,	 removing	
the	 consequences	 of	 natural	 disasters	 and	 humanitarian	 disas-
ters,	etc.).	The	responses	by	the	atamans	as	posted	on	the	websites	
40	 Министерство	 Обороны	 Российской	 Федерации	 недовольно	 отно-
шением	казаков	к	военной	службе,	http://kazak-center.ru/news/1/2012-
02-06-1827




















(by	 spreading	 the	 idea	 of	 Cossackdom,	 explaining	 its	 strategic	
role,	giving	introductory	notes,	etc.).	
The	tone	of	this	propaganda	has	been	set	by	the	Kremlin.	For	ex-
ample,	 during	 Putin’s	 presidential	 election	 campaign	 in	 2012,	 he	
made	a	statement	concerning	the	strategic	importance	of	the	Cos-
sacks	—	 a	 ‘great	 group,	 numbering	 of	millions	 of	 Russians’.	The	
President	clearly	emphasised	that	the	Cossacks	are	under	the	care	








































Orthodox	 tradition;	 the	 patriarch	 assigned	 the	 Cossack	 state	 the	
role	 of	 “the	 vanguard	 of	 the	Orthodox	brotherhood	 of	 battle”	 and	
of	“the	spiritual,	cultural	and	social	 forces	of	 the	Russian	world.”46	
















































Kozitsyn	 in	 Ukraine,	 or	 the	 growing	 number	 of	 attacks	 on	 the	
Kremlin’s	political	opponents	(the	attack	in	Sochi	on	members	of	




people,	 the	 ostentatious	 destruction	 of	 forbidden	 food	 imports	




Above	 all,	 however,	 the	 official	 propaganda	 deploys	 a	 sense	 of	
threat	from	the	West,	as	well	as	pride	in	the	new	territorial	‘con-


























II. THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE COSSACK 
QUESTION
The alleged values of Cossackdom as portrayed by the state 
and the Orthodox Church (loyalty, patriotism, observance of 
the ethical standards of Orthodoxy, the traditional model of 
a large family, and above all a militarised lifestyle) coincide 
with the objectives of the Kremlin, for whom a ‘statified’ Cos-
sackdom is equivalent to its use as a model group of so-called 
civil society. For that reason, the Kremlin has been placing 
emphasis in its official state documents and programmes on 
the patriotic education of Cossack youth, reinforcing the sen-
timent of state service, and preparing Cossacks for military 
service and the defence of public order, including expanding 
their repressive functions (breaking up opposition demon-
strations and harassing opposition activists). Transforming 
the Cossacks into a systemic element of the state’s security 
and defence architecture will lead to the regional authorities 
bearing the costs of this process.
1. The Kremlin’s strategic objectives
The	Kremlin’s	vision	of	 the	Cossacks	 is	manifested	 in	 the	docu-
ments	dedicated	to	them.	The	first	such	document	was	the	Concept 
of the Russian Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossacks,	
from	2008.	It	is	characterised	by	great	vagueness,	although	it	did	
give	the	Cossacks’	activity	 the	direction	of	development	desired	
by	 the	 Kremlin,	 by	 laying	 the	 emphasis	 on	 their	 state	 service.	
A	more	precisely	defined	document,	which	fits	in	with	the	Krem-
lin’s	overall	plans	for	ensuring	the	state’s	internal	and	external	se-
curity,	is	the	Strategy for the development of the Russian Federation’s 





















•	 by	 creating	 economic	 conditions	 which	 would	 involve	 the	























•	 supporting	 the	 international	 activities	 of	 the	 Russian	 Cos-
sacks;
•	 protecting	the	heraldic	livery	of	the	Russian	Cossacks’	activi-
ties	 (i.e.	 standardising	 the	 distinguishing	 marks,	 uniform	

















the	Cossacks	 in	 resolving	 the	 state’s	 and	 local	 tasks’,	 ‘the	maxi-
mum	use	of	 the	potential	of	Cossack	organisations	and	commu-


























was	 justified	by	moving	 the	Cossacks	 to	a	 self-financing	model.	
Another	 innovation	was	 the	scale	of	 the	project,	which	covered	


























•	The creation of a central database of Cossack organisations through 
their duplicate registration; issuing their members new Cossack 
IDs;
•	The creation of a legal basis for the transition of Cossack organi-
sations to the self-financing model (the establishment of private 
protection companies, the assignment to Cossack communities of 
agricultural allotments from the state land fund);
•	Development of Cossack education (the ‘Cossack component’);












•	Improving the federal and local legal bases for the Cossacks’ state 
service;
•	Recruiting ‘Cossack’ military units to 80% capacity;
•	Signing contracts with members of the military Cossack associa-
tions for their voluntary participation in the reserves, to be called 
up during states of emergency and at the outbreak of war;
•	Appointing private protection companies for all Cossack troops;
•	Adopting regional and municipal programmes to support the devel-
opment of the Russian Cossacks;
•	Implementing programmes for creating/reconstructing the mili-










•	Transferring all Cossack associations to the state registry, ensuring 
that 100% of their members hold the new Cossack IDs;
•	National service to be carried out by at least 35% of the military Cos-
sack associations’ members;
•	Cossack military associations are to be self-financing organisations 
(on the basis of their contracts with local authorities, their private 
businesses and farms);
•	Members of military associations are included in the records of the 
reserves of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, to be called 
up during states of emergency and the outbreak of war;
•	In the Southern Military District, an experiment is being carried 
out to call up the organisational reserve of one or two Cossack mili-
tary associations;
•	Extending continual Cossack education programs for Cossack youth 
in the CIS countries, as well as establishing a network of summer 
camps for patriotic and civic-military education for young Cossacks 
within the CIS.
•	The organisation of a World Forum for Cossack Orthodox Youth and 



















the	plan	for	actions	to	implement	the	Strategy of the state’s policy 























































ment.	A	significant	part	of	 these	 laws	are	also	purely	 formal	 in	
nature.	For	example,	 the	Federal	Security	Service	 is	 committed	
to	 employing	 the	 Cossacks	 to	 defend	 the	 borders	 (as	 they	 have	











































amounted	 to	 3.1	 billion	 roubles	 (US$52.5m).	 The	 largest	 sums	
from	 this	 programme	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 organising	 the	 state	
service	of	the	Cossacks	(1.8	billion	roubles,	or	US$30.5m),	the	Cos-
sack	cadet	corps	(730	million	roubles,	or	US$12.4m),	the	activities	





































These	 stated	 commitments	 to	 supporting	 the	 Cossacks’	 socio-





















2. The institutional system for governing the Cossacks
The bureaucratic mechanisms for the development of Cossack-
dom built into the Strategy for the development of the Russian 
Federation’s state policy towards the Russian Cossack to 2020 
are being implemented by the structures for ‘cooperation with 
the Cossacks’ created for this purpose. These have appeared in 
most central government departments, in all the federal dis-


















been obliged to adopt separate legislation on the development 
of the Cossacks’ state service compatible with federal legisla-
tion. At the top of this hierarchical and bureaucratised pyra-
mid is the Presidential Council for Cossack Affairs.
















to	 include	 the	Council	of	 the	Cossack	Troops’	Atamans,	chaired	








































•	 the	 committee	 for	 the	 development	 of	 state	 policy	 towards	
the	Cossacks	(Igor	Barinov,	head	of	the	government’s	Federal	
Agency	for	Nationality	Affairs);
•	 the	 committee	 for	 normative	 legal	 acts	 (Maxim	 Travnikov,	
deputy	minister	of	justice);







































sia,	 the	 Trans-Baikal	 Cossacks),	 the	ministers	 of	 culture	 of	 the	










































tions	 and	 a	 separate	 committee	 supporting	 the	 development	 of	





Strategy for developing the Russian Federation’s state policy towards 
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headquarters	 in	 the	Don	Monastery	 in	Moscow.	This	 is	also	 the	








































entitled	The fundamental directions of spiritual/educational work 
with the Cossack communities	underlines	the	importance	of	the	Cos-












the	Church	hierarchs.	And	not	 only	 that:	 like	 the	Kremlin,	 the	
Church	is	playing	the	Cossack	card	and	strengthening	its	position	
in	society	by	doing	so.	The	platform	for	the	co-operation	between	
the	State	 and	 the	Orthodox	Church	 is	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘Orthodox	
civilisation’	which	forms	the	basis	of	the	civilisational	paradigm	
of	the	Russian	government’s	policy,	according	to	which	interna-
tional	 relations	 is	 a	 space	 for	 either	 competition	or	 cooperation	
























Ukrainian	 Cossacks73,	 the	 Synod	 Committee’s	 press	 service	 is	


































NEO-COSSACKDOM AS A SYSTEMIC, ALL-IN-ONE TOOL 
OF	THE KREMLIN
In	 the	 recent	 history	 of	 Russian	 Cossackdom,	 two	 periods	 are	











The	 division	 into	 registered	 and	 unregistered	 (social)	 Cossacks	
was	established	by	a	federal	law	on	the	state	service	of	the	Russian	
Cossacks	in	2005.	The	formal,	highly	bureaucratised	and	Krem-




desire	 to	overcome	 these	divisions,	 and	on	 the	other	by	 the	au-
thorities’	 awareness	 that	modern	 Cossackdom	will	 not	 of	 itself	
transform	into	a	civil	society	capable	of	self-organisation	and	self-
governance.	Obstacles	 to	 implementing	 this	 scenario	have	been	
systemically	 cleared	 away	 (by	 legal	 and	 organisational	means);	
In	addition,	there	is	no	room	in	Russian	political	culture	for	the	
agency	of	 society.	The	Cossacks’	 superficial	 ‘self-organisation’	 is	
controlled	and	maintained	from	the	top	down,	and	supported	eco-























an	 infrastructure	 for	 the	 desired	model	 of	 development	 for	 so-
called	civil	society	in	Russia.	
Neo-Cossackdom,	which	the	Kremlin	regards	as	a	systemic	aux-
iliary	 element	 in	 its	 security	 and	 defence	 architecture,	 is	 still	




of	 the	Cossacks,	 highlighting	 their	 cultural	 distinctiveness	 and	
military-defensive	way	of	life.	This	memory	has	mainly	been	used	
instrumentally	 in	 the	 military-patriotic	 education	 of	 children	
and	young	people,	as	well	as	in	implementing	the	Cossacks’	mili-




ing	society	 in	 the	 face	of	alleged	new	threats	 (illegal	migration,	



































Function Method of implementation
military
•	the organisational base of the civil and territorial de-
fence of the Russian Federation;
•	reserve personnel, in a state of permanent standby;
•	auxiliary formations of the border patrol;
•	volunteer forces in armed conflicts which Russia does 
not officially participate in;




•	volunteer auxiliary police teams;
•	private security services for state and municipal facili-
ties;
•	security at mass events, Olympics and soccer champi-
onships;
•	interventions during opposition meetings;
•	checks on supermarkets for the sale of forbidden food 
imports;
economical
•	relieving the federal budget for security and defence by 
means of self-financing Cossack military associations;
•	production of food for the armed forces and other stra-
tegic consumers;
•	ensuring the food security of the Russian Federation;
•	Cossack entrepreneurship as a screen for businesses 
















Function Method of implementation
political
•	strengthening Russian statehood;
•	disciplining national minorities; 
•	a tool to fight the opposition;
•	supporting the special services in their active engage-
ments; 
•	outposts of the ‘Russian world’ in countries of the ‘near 
and far abroad’;
social
•	the militarisation and military organisation of society;
•	the government’s social infrastructure;
•	the patriotic upbringing of youth and society in a spirit 
of service to the state;
•	the social factor in the fight against new threats (Islam-
ic fundamentalism, extremism, illegal migration, etc.);
•	volunteer patrols of the civil militia; 




•	shaping a new civilisational identity for Russian soci-
ety; 
•	strengthening neo-imperial ideology (Cossacks as the 
vanguard in Russia’s Eurasian ideology);
•	an instrument of ‘defence’: the fight against Western 
values and the dissemination of so-called traditional 
conservative values, based on Orthodoxy;
decorative
•	participation in parades on Red Square and state cel-
ebrations (this mainly applies to the Kuban Honorary 
Troops);
•	support for regional initiatives and patriotic celebra-
tions;
•	providing security for the Orthodox Church and mon-
asteries, including the seat of the Patriarch;
•	dignifying the religious services of the Russian Ortho-
dox Church;
•	Cossack folklore as PR for Russia, e.g. national song and 
dance ensembles: the Kuban Cossack Choir, the Song 
and Dance Ensemble of the Don Cossacks of Rostov, the 



















ter.	At	 the	propaganda	 level,	 it	 is	distinguished	by	an	ability	 to	
cooperate	in	strengthening	the	military	organisation	of	the	state	





the	main	message	of	the	Strategy of the Russian Federation’s policy 
towards the Cossacks to 2020.	However,	 the	question	of	how	well	
the	development	of	the	neo-Cossacks	 is	managed,	as	well	as	the	
Putin	 system’s	 ability	 to	 generate	 new	 projects	 and	 corrective	
mechanisms	for	them,	remains	problematic.	Those	currently	be-
ing	implemented,	with	regard	to	the	new	strategic	objectives,	are	
merely	replicating	the	old	ideas,	and	thus	preserving	the	patholo-
gies	of	the	Russian	political-economic	system.
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